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ABSTRACT 
 This paper documents how the narrative of space exploration in the United States (U.S.) has 
changed from the Cold War to today. It examines the policy and rhetoric of eight U.S. presidential 
administrations in regards to space exploration: Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nixon, Reagan, George H. W. 
Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama. The paper also discusses how the overall field of space 
exploration has changed over time. To investigate this narrative, the paper first examines the history of 
U.S. space exploration from the Cold War to today, and also examines three current conditions of the 
field of space exploration, including: 1) the increasing role of the private sector, 2) the influence of global 
politics and specifically the emergence of China as a global space power, and 3) the current focus on a 
manned mission to Mars. The Cold War was a period in which the direct competition between the United 
States and the Soviet Union played out within the field of space exploration. This meant that space 
initiatives in the U.S. were predominantly centered and motivated around themes of national prestige and 
pride. However, after the end of the Cold War, there is a shift in U.S. space goals, toward increased 
interest in the benefits of international collaboration and cooperation. The shift demonstrates the effect of 
modern globalization, as well as the realities of a space exploration field that increasingly encompasses 
many different players beyond just the United States and the Soviet Union. In order to further understand 
the narrative of U.S. space exploration, the paper compiles a list of five rhetorical themes: competition, 
prestige, collaboration, leadership, and a new paradigm. These themes are then utilized to analyze the 
content of forty documents over the course of space exploration history in the U.S. from the 
aforementioned eight U.S. presidential administrations. The historical narrative and content analysis 
together suggest that space exploration has developed from a straightforward, bipolar arena between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, into a complicated field that encompasses many new players in the 
national to the industrial realms. The results also suggest that the United States is currently at a crossroads 
in which the U.S. must quickly make a decision on how it wants to participate in this changing field of 
space exploration. This paper identifies three challenges regarding U.S. space policy in the current era. 
These three challenges are: 1) there is a disconnect between stated policy goals in American space 
exploration efforts and the implementation of those goals, 2) the United States communicates mixed 
messages regarding its intent to be both the dominant leader in the field of space exploration and 
committed as a participant in international collaboration, and 3) the United States cannot remain a true 
pioneer of space exploration if it does not embrace the realities of globalization and the changing 
dynamics within the field of space exploration. After discussing the above three challenges, the paper 
recommends that: 1) U.S. government and NASA should critically examine space exploration priorities 
and commit to implementing a program that will further realistic and robust stated policy and goals, 2) the 
U.S. should reexamine its intention to play a dominant leadership role in space exploration, and consider 
emphasizing a commitment toward active participation in international collaboration in space, and 3) the 
United States should fully embrace the new paradigm of space exploration by - lowering barriers like 
ITAR that hinder the competitiveness of the American space industry, committing to collaborative 
endeavors with rising space-faring nations such as China and abandoning Cold War era thinking, and 
paving the way to Mars by encouraging the participation of many nations and space agencies on future 
manned missions. 
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PREFACE 
 When I was a child, if I happened to be alone for the afternoon while my mother was at work, I 
would rearrange our living room into a makeshift spaceship, constructed from dining room chairs and 
couch pillows. At the head of the fabricated ship was a large cardboard book that detailed facts of each of 
the planets of our Solar System, which I used as a map to guide my imagination into outer space. As I ran 
my finger down the list of Jupiter’s moons and called out to my first mate - a small teddy bear - to set 
course for Europa, I etched into my fantasies images of a starlit horizon that melted into the inky 
blackness of space. These images would remain in my imagination for the rest of my life. 
 The fascination I have for outer space and all of its mysteries is a fascination that many other 
people share - especially many Americans. Those of us that grew up in the United States after the Cold 
War have been taught to revere figures like Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin, pioneers who embody the 
“American” qualities of bravery, curiosity, and determination. When we look to the stars, we think of 
those who came before us and paved the way beyond the limits of our own planet Earth. 
 But growing up, I was also always interested the story of space exploration, and especially where 
we were headed into the future. I knew that American space exploration had a sense of nationalism to it, 
but I also grew up watching shows like Star Trek. For me, space symbolized the true scientific unknown. 
I didn’t see space as a symbol of the power of any one individual country, but rather, an opportunity for 
many cultures to unite together as an entire human race, and move forward into the future. I felt that the 
attitudes of the past, while motivating during the Cold War era, needed to be left in the past in order for 
humanity to truly make steps toward global progress. And yet what I was seeing was that the United 
States clung to rhetoric of the past and was unable to let go of ego in order to move into the next era of 
space exploration. 
 When I was a second year college student, I came across this quote from the astrophysicist and 
science communicator, Neil DeGrasse Tyson: 
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I look up at the night sky, and I know that, yes, we are part of this universe, we are in this 
universe, but perhaps more important than both of those facts is that the universe is in us. 
When I reflect on that fact, I look up. Many people feel small, because they’re small and  
the universe is big, but I feel big, because my atoms came from those stars. 
 
Although space is infinite and holds so much unknown, I don’t feel small or insignificant. 
Instead, space makes me feel important, because when I look up at the stars, I feel as though I share a 
history and a future with what is beyond this planet. I truly think space is “the final frontier,” and I am 
glad to live in a time in which technology has allowed us to make monumental leaps of knowledge 
regarding what outer space holds. As an American, I benefit from my country’s history in space, and I 
feel proud of what my Nation has accomplished. However, instead of focusing on that history as a source 
of egotism, I want to see the U.S. truly make an effort to reach out to other space-faring nations and unite 
them into a future in which humanity works together as a whole, rather than just as individual nations. My 
reasoning behind this paper, and why I chose to write on this topic, is because I envision a future where 
humanity comes together to explore the wonders of space. By examining the past and where we are 
currently in relation to the past, we can understand what we need to do in order to succeed in the future. 
The history of space exploration, especially in the United States, is rich and fascinating, but I truly believe 
that the best of our story is still yet to come. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 In the summer of 2015, world-renowned astrophysicist and host of StarTalk Radio Neil deGrasse 
Tyson conducted a podcast interview with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
Administrator General Charles Bolden. Tyson spoke of a shift in how the United States conducts itself in 
the arena of space exploration, explaining, “We have entered a new era...now we’re in a different world, 
where other countries are rising in their presence on the space frontier. We should be curious what 
NASA’s plans are in a world where we’re not the only player in town.”1 Bolden responded, “We [now] 
teach people, we act as a model for how people of different cultures, different races, different nationalities 
can in fact work together.”2 In discussing NASA’s current emphasis on international collaboration and 
cooperation as the model for how the United States (U.S.) will explore outer space in the future, the two 
men also highlight how this emphasis affects the meaning and purpose of space exploration for the Nation 
as a whole. Bolden and Tyson also reference change, contrasting the past to the present, which reveals 
that the American space program recognizes it is currently at an important point in the history of space 
exploration. 
 The history of space exploration in the United States is often spoken of with a great sense of 
national pride. It is very evident that the American persona, which values ideals like innovation, curiosity, 
and determination, is reflected in how the U.S. has interpreted its role in international space exploration in 
the past, and continues to be an important value in the present. But how has the understanding of that role 
changed over time? By examining the rhetorical themes within U.S. national space policy, leadership 
statements, and policy recommendations throughout American history, we see that the way the United 
States presents its role in international space exploration directly mirrors the Nation’s motivations in 
foreign policy and national security. Rhetorical themes can be used as a window into the mindset of 
leaders and policymakers. Therefore, the research question this paper explores is: how has the narrative of 
                                               
1 “NASA’s Vision for Space Exploration with Charles Bolden,” Narrated by Neil deGrasse Tyson and Bill Nye, 
Interview with Charles F. Bolden, Jr. and Michael Shara, StarTalk, StarTalk Radio Show with Neil deGrasse Tyson, 
2015. 
2 Ibid. 
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space exploration in the U.S. changed from the birth of the American space program to today? By 
following the narrative of space exploration in the United States, through the rhetorical themes that can be 
found, it is possible, through the lens of space policy, to trace the development of national and 
international goals of the United States. As these goals have changed since the beginning of space 
exploration in the U.S. in the Cold War, so has the U.S. voice in space exploration. However, due to the 
struggle to actualize ambitious goals in space, national U.S. space policy goals often remain purely 
rhetorical. Today, the United States finds itself at a crossroads between the familiar position of 
geopolitical posturing to maintain national prestige, and showing leadership in promoting the next steps 
toward a truly global, collective field of space research. 
RESEARCH APPROACH 
 In order to explore the narrative of space exploration in the United States, this paper investigates 
the policies and rhetoric of U.S. space exploration from the Cold War era to today. To track these 
changes, the paper’s research into how space exploration in the United States has changed over time is 
conducted in two parts. The first part comprises a historical narrative, which serves as the background 
context for how the field of space exploration itself has changed over time. In the historical narrative, the 
state of American space exploration within the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nixon, Reagan, George H. W. 
Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama administrations is explored. The Johnson administration is 
also briefly discussed along with Kennedy, as his policies and goals were similar to Kennedy’s. Ford and 
Carter were not included in this historical narrative due to the similarities of space policies during other 
administrations around the same time. Along with the examination of presidential administrations, the 
paper also looks at three broader conditions within the field of space exploration, in order to understand 
their influence on the field overall. These three additional conditions are: 1) globalization and the growing 
presence of private industry in space exploration, 2) the International Space Station as a representative of 
international collaboration in space exploration with a specific look at possible Chinese participation, and 
3) the framework for future explorative efforts to Mars. 
 Holland 8 
The second part of the paper is a content analysis of U.S. space policy documentation over time. 
The content analysis together with the historical narrative traces the evolution of space exploration in the 
United States. Within the content analysis section, the paper examines forty documents that include: space 
policy and rhetoric releases from the eight aforementioned presidential administrations, statements 
concerning space exploration from U.S. presidents and other leaders, and policy recommendations made 
to the U.S. government for advised action in space exploration from experts within the field. The content 
analysis allows for a clearer understanding of the rhetorical evolution of space exploration, and therefore, 
in combination with the historical narrative, we can see not only changes over time, but the state in which 
the United States finds itself today. Understanding the evolution of these themes is essential in evaluating 
where the Nation needs to take steps to further progress in space exploration. 
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PART I: HISTORICAL NARRATIVE 
SPACE EXPLORATION DURING THE COLD WAR (1955-1991) 
 Although the inception of the American space program was influenced by the development of the 
space technologies of the Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.), it was not initially intended to serve as a symbol of 
national pride or international competition. Under Eisenhower, U.S. space exploration was designed to 
represent American scientific achievements, not perpetuate political objectives. Though Eisenhower’s 
vision for American space exploration saw space as a scientific arena in which nations could further 
global progress instead of competition, this vision would fall to the side as the relationship between space 
and nationalism became stronger in later administrations. 
On September 12, 1962, President John F. Kennedy proclaimed before a crowd of 35,000 that the 
United States had chosen to forge the pathway to the moon “not because it is easy, but because it is 
hard.”3 He called out to the American pioneering spirit, stretching out a vision of success and prestige for 
the U.S. in the new frontier of outer space. The conquest of space was to become intrinsically tied to what 
it meant to be American, and with his rallying speech, Kennedy solidified the rhetorical link between U.S. 
prestige and dominance in space exploration. This set the predominant tone for the Cold War era of U.S. 
space endeavors. Although interest in aspects like collaboration and cooperation remained, prestige and 
competition would take precedence.  
 The political bipolarity of the Cold War, in which world power was split between the two “poles” 
of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, was so prolific in every facet of society that space, the next step for 
human exploration, quickly became a proxy for competition. The following section will explore the 
historical context of space exploration during the Cold War, including what motivated the United States 
to enter into direct competition with the Soviet Union in space exploration, what attitudes and 
perspectives drove the development of America’s space program, and how the American leaders of the 
Cold War shaped the history of U.S. space exploration. 
                                               
3 John F. Kennedy, “Address at Rice University on Nation’s Space Effort,” Rice University, Houston, Texas, NASA 
JSC, 1962, 2. 
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EISENHOWER AND THE SPUTNIK CRISIS 
 On April 16th, 1955, over two years before the launch of Sputnik 1, the Soviet newspaper 
Vechernyaya moskva (Evening Moscow) announced the creation of a new Soviet commission for 
interplanetary communications. This marked the beginning of official Soviet interest in developing its 
own space technologies. The article claimed that the primary goal of the new commission was “to 
organize work concerned with building an automatic laboratory for scientific research in space”4 - an 
ambitious claim that was, in actuality, not true. The Soviet Union had not even begun preparations for the 
three Sputnik satellites they would launch between 1957 and 1958, let alone an entire space laboratory. 
But when American print media caught wind of the bold claims made by Vechernyaya moskva, the 
shocking premise of a Soviet laboratory in space led them to publish their own articles in response the 
following day. The Washington Post ran an article titled, “Interplanetary commission created: Russians 
planning space laboratory for research beyond Earth’s gravity.”5 The Vechernyaya moskva article was 
purely Soviet propaganda, and it achieved its goal - the United States was now aware that the Soviet 
Union was making preparations for entering into the space arena, and had begun to panic. The U.S., a 
country that prided itself on its international leadership, prestige, and technological superiority over the 
“backwards” Soviet Union, suddenly felt immense pressure due to the possibility of falling behind. Had 
the “Space Race” between the United States and the Soviet Union begun?  
 In 1954, the International Council of Scientific Unions, a collection of scientists from all over the 
world, passed a resolution calling for artificial satellites to be launched for the purposes of mapping the 
Earth’s surface.6 These satellites would be launched during what was to be known as the International 
Geophysical Year (IGY), a period of time from July 1957 to December 1958. Both the Soviet Union and 
the United States were member states of the council, and made their own plans to launch a satellite during 
the IGY. The United States began the Vanguard project, and the Soviet Union, the Sputnik project. 
                                               
4 “Komissiya po mezhplanetnykh soobshcheniy,” Vechernyaya moskva, April 16, 1955. 
5 “Interplanetary Commission Created: Russians Planning Space Laboratory for Research Beyond Earth’s Gravity,” 
Washington Post, April 17, 1955. 
6 “Sputnik and the Dawn of the Space Age,” NASA History, 2007, 1. 
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However, President Eisenhower did not view the IGY as a “race” with the Soviet Union7, and 
instead chose to focus on the scientific promise of developing a satellite, rather than the prestige element 
of outcompeting a rival. Eisenhower was predominantly a strategist and a planner,8 and therefore because 
“prestige...was not the driving force behind the project,”9 the development of Vanguard proceeded at a 
relatively slow pace. 
 In contrast, the Soviet Union was very interested in the propaganda value of launching the 
world’s first satellite. Therefore, it outpaced the U.S. and launched Sputnik 1 in October 1957, and 
achieved the ultimate first of the “space firsts.” Sputnik 1 shattered the assumption that the United States 
was the default technological world leader,10 and the success of the Soviet satellite program created a 
“Sputnik crisis” throughout American society. Within the United States, the launch “sparked a national 
soul-searching,”11 as Sputnik revealed a psychological vulnerability. For citizens that viewed themselves 
as a part of the Western, “free world,” with its superior technology in comparison to their communist 
neighbors, the knowledge that the Soviet Union had surpassed the U.S. in an area of science came as a 
shock. During this crisis of confidence, members of Eisenhower’s administration grew frustrated with the 
president over his unwillingness to utilize the space program to promote American prestige. 
 Yet Eisenhower refused to believe that prestige was something the United States needed to 
“purchase,” and instead continued to promote the scientific value of the U.S. satellite program.12 He 
remained unperturbed in the face of the Sputnik 1 success, much to the exasperation of others. In a press 
conference two days after Sputnik 1 began to orbit the Earth, reporters prompted Eisenhower to respond 
directly to the threat that the satellite had posed to American prestige, asking, “What are we going to do 
                                               
7 Linda T. Krug, Presidential Perspectives on Space Exploration: Guiding Metaphors from Eisenhower to Bush, 
Praeger Publishers, 1991, 23. 
8 Ibid, 25. 
9 Giles Alston, “Eisenhower: Leadership in Space Policy,” Reexamining the Eisenhower Presidency, Ed. Shirley 
Anne Warshaw, Greenwood Press, 1993, 106. 
10 Yanek Mieczkowski, Eisenhower’s Sputnik Moment: The Race for Space and World Prestige, Cornell University 
Press, 2013, 17. 
11 Walter A. McDougall, “Sputnik, the Space Race, and the Cold War,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 41.5, 1985, 
22. 
12 Alston, 104. 
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about it?”13 One reporter asked specifically if it was a mistake not to recognize that the United States was 
in a race with the Soviet Union.14 To these questions, Eisenhower responded: 
 
Now, quite naturally, you will say, “Well, the Soviets gained a great psychological 
advantage throughout the world,” and I think in the political sense this is possibly true. 
But in the scientific sense, it is not true, except for the proof of the one thing, that they 
have got the propellants and the projectors that will put these things in the air.15 
 
About the launching of Sputnik 1, Eisenhower remarked: 
 
[The Soviet Union has] proved again and, indeed, this launching of the satellite proves, 
that they can hurl an object a considerable distance.16 
 
 However, not everyone shared Eisenhower’s indifferent attitude toward the rising Soviet presence 
in space, and after Sputnik 1, there was mounting pressure from Eisenhower’s political opponents for the 
president to respond to the blow to American credibility.17 He earned the nickname of the “do-nothing” 
president as a result of how he responded to Sputnik 1.18 Over time, despite his beliefs, Eisenhower could 
not escape the political rhetoric of the Cold War era. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) was established in 1958, and as NASA developed, one of the primary goals for the new U.S. 
space program did in fact become prestige. The President’s Science Advisory Committee listed prestige 
along with other goals of space research in the United States, such as science exploration and defense,19 
and the National Security Council (NSC) reported that, “continued Soviet superiority in space might 
undermine U.S. prestige and security.”20 
  
  
                                               
13 Eisenhower, Dwight D. “Official White House Transcript of President Eisenhower’s Press and Radio Conference 
#123 (Filmed, Taped, and Shorthand Reported),” Eisenhower Presidential Archives, 1957, 4. 
14 Ibid, 7. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid, 6. 
17 Alston, 104. 
18 Krug, 25. 
19 McDougall, 22. 
20 Ibid. 
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 In recent years, Eisenhower’s stance on not only the Soviet Union’s space program, but also the 
values behind the founding of NASA, has been the subject of reexamination and reevaluation.21 His 
insistence on looking at the bigger picture might have gotten lost in the Cold War mentality of the 1960s, 
but it is a perspective that has come to be appreciated today. Giles Alston explains that Eisenhower’s 
refusal to utilize space exploration as a tool in a “race” with the Soviet Union can be regarded in today’s 
era as “a crucial element of stability” that space policy later lacked.22 
It is true that the “race” mentality dominated the direction of space exploration in the United 
States during the Cold War, and it is a mentality that the United States continues to struggle to leave 
behind. Although Eisenhower had the foresight to envision a space program that placed science before 
politics, this view would not be shared by subsequent administrations. Particularly, in the following 
administration under John F. Kennedy, rhetoric of American prestige would dominate discussions of 
space exploration in the U.S. with the “race to the moon.” 
KENNEDY AND THE RACE FOR PRESTIGE 
 Despite the fact that the Apollo Project and Kennedy’s clear policy goal of placing an American 
on the moon by the end of the 1960s has become one of the identifying aspects of his presidency, 
Kennedy himself once remarked that he was “not that interested in space.”23 For all intents and purposes, 
he recognized the political importance of the Space Race, but unlike his predecessor, he did not see things 
from the perspective of the scientist. Instead, he advocated for space because he believed that America 
needed to “get ahead” of the Soviet Union.24 On the campaign trail before his presidency, Kennedy often 
challenged the past mentality of the Eisenhower era, proclaiming that there was a need to “get the country 
moving again.”25 
                                               
21 Alston, 105. 
22 Ibid. 
23 “Transcript of White House Meeting with John F. Kennedy and NASA members,” NASA History, November 21, 
1962. 
24 Ibid. 
25 John M. Logsdon, John F. Kennedy and the Race to the Moon, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, 11. 
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U.S. space exploration was a political tool for Kennedy, and provided him an opportunity to 
regain international confidence in America after the Bay of Pigs incident, the failed U.S. paramilitary 
invasion of Cuba that had damaged the reputation of the United States.26 In order to regain credibility, 
Kennedy sought for an area in which the United States could become the undisputed leader and surpass 
the Soviet Union during the Cold War. He instructed Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson to find a program 
that the U.S. could “pioneer.”27 Space exploration was the avenue that Johnson chose for the United 
States to demonstrate superiority over the Soviet Union. In order to take preeminence in space 
exploration, the United States needed to identify a target that held great psychological impact that could 
be utilized against the U.S.S.R. Thus, the idea of “the race to the moon” was born, and landing an 
American on the moon became the most important goal for the U.S. space program. This turned space 
exploration in the United States into a “visible symbol of national vitality.”28 
National prestige became the centerpiece of motivations behind U.S. space exploration.29 The 
Soviet Union also capitalized on its own successes in space. It achieved another “space first” when Yuri 
Gagarin became the first human to orbit the Earth on April 12, 1961, which the Soviet Union utilized as 
propaganda against the United States.30 Global space exploration began to take on the characteristics of “a 
bipolar struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union for global leadership,”31 and this led to 
U.S. space policy becoming yet another area in which the framing of U.S.-Soviet competition emerged. 
The U.S. space program, a program that was once primarily considered to be a scientific institution first,32 
transitioned into a vital instrument of enacting national strategy. 
When Kennedy encouraged the American people to join him on a journey to revitalize American 
prestige, reaching the moon (and subsequently space endeavors in general) immediately became directly 
tied to the national identity of the United States. This was an extension of overall Cold War posturing, in 
                                               
26 Krug, 30. 
27 John F. Kennedy, “News Conference 9, April 12, 1961,” John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, 1961, 1. 
28 McDougall, 24. 
29 Logsdon, Kennedy, 33. 
30 Ibid, 72. 
31 Ibid, 89. 
32 Ibid, 117. 
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which the U.S. advocated for the superiority of American ideology over that of the Soviet Union. 
Kennedy stated in his “Moon Speech” at Rice Stadium in Houston, Texas, “no nation which expects to be 
the leader of other nations can expect to stay behind in the race for space.”33 Referring to U.S. goals in 
space exploration, he further stated, “we mean to be a part of it - we mean to lead it.”34 Kennedy insisted 
that the United States would not only make efforts to explore outer space for individual reasons, but that it 
would do this to demonstrate American greatness to the rest of the world. Again referencing American 
prestige, Kennedy proclaimed, “the vows of this Nation can only be fulfilled if we in this Nation are 
first.”35 Under Kennedy, the United States would pioneer ahead into the new frontier of space in an act 
not necessarily for the sole purpose of discovery, but for international influence and preeminence. 
 Despite the overruling rhetoric of competition and prestige, Kennedy interspersed in his 
proclamations of American greatness calls for cooperation with the Soviet Union. Logsdon writes, “it is 
worth noting that JFK’s initial priority on becoming president was to make space an area for U.S.-Soviet 
cooperation.”36 Ideas about collaboration can be found even during the height of “moon rhetoric,” but 
because the moon became a national goal in response to the success of Yuri Gagarin, it wasn’t until the 
end of his presidency that Kennedy began to lessen his rhetoric of American excellence. Instead, he began 
to ask whether or not it was possible to go to the moon together with the Soviet Union.37 In almost 
complete contrast to his earlier rhetoric, Kennedy began to reach out to the U.S.S.R. later in his 
presidency. In 1962, his administration released a National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM), 
recommending cooperation with the U.S.S.R. in space exploration.38 Addressing the United Nations 
General Assembly in September of 1963, Kennedy questioned why the race to the moon couldn’t be a 
joint effort between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.39 However, due to silence from the Soviet Union on 
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Kennedy’s gesture and the president’s assassination two months after his United Nations speech,40 
collaboration between the two great superpowers remained just an idea. 
 Logsdon explains that after the assassination of Kennedy, the U.S. space program and lunar 
missions effectively became a memorial to the late president. Johnson, vice president and successor, made 
virtually no changes to the plans laid out by the former president, in part because he had previously 
shared the same outlook, but also because these goals served as a memory to a beloved leader. Kennedy 
left behind a legacy in which the journey to space was inseparable from the concept of the American spirit 
itself, and the impact of the Apollo missions on not only the U.S. space program but also American 
society was significant. Kennedy had turned the space program into a “larger than life” character, and a 
source of national pride. 
 The space program continued to thrive during the Johnson administration. Johnson was familiar 
with competitive space rhetoric, as he had been the chair of the Senate space committee under 
Eisenhower, and a vocal critic of Eisenhower’s response to Sputnik 1.41 However, over the course of the 
Johnson administration, as the U.S. began to take the lead away from the Soviet Union in space, 
Johnson’s leadership rhetoric began to lose the “stark polarity” between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.42 Like 
Kennedy, Johnson began to look at the possibilities of collaboration in space. However Johnson had many 
other issues competing for his attention, like civil rights and the Vietnam War. But as the country became 
more involved in these pressing issues, Johnson’s commitment to space fell to the side. By the end of the 
1960s, despite the excitement generated by the upcoming launch of Apollo 11, the future of America’s 
space program was somewhat uncertain. 
NIXON AND THE NORMALIZATION OF SPACE 
 When Richard Nixon was sworn in as President of the United States of America on January 20th, 
1969 (exactly six months before the launch of Apollo 11), he, like Johnson before him, was not a stranger 
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to the U.S. space program. Nixon had stood at Eisenhower’s side when Sputnik 1 had rippled waves of 
panic throughout American society, and in response had warned that it would be a mistake for the United 
States to simply brush off the Soviet success as a publicity stunt.43 He also was familiar with the old 
rhetoric of competition and prestige, but when Nixon inherited the space program, the program, and the 
world itself, was much changed. The ongoing war in Vietnam had deeply affected U.S. society and 
American attitudes toward the outside world, especially those that suggested the U.S. should expand 
outward. Nixon himself was highly invested in the success of landing an American on the moon due to 
the promise of good publicity, but as for what came after that, he was less interested. After Apollo 11, 
when it seemed evident that the United States had taken preeminence in space, Americans no longer felt 
the same sense of excitement from NASA as they had in the past.44 To those that remained interested in 
space and looked to the future, “after the Moon, Mars,” became the motto. However, because space was 
not a high priority for Nixon and the public had become preoccupied with other societal concerns, there 
was no sense of urgency to define what came after the Apollo missions.45 
 NASA found itself in a bit of an identity crisis. Unable to rely solely on themes like competition 
and prestige to gather support, as it had in the past, the program felt lost. When Nixon set out to create a 
new identity for the space program, he led with a pragmatic outlook on the future of U.S. space 
exploration.46 The cancellation of the Apollo 18-20 missions, as well as cuts to NASA’s budget made it 
clear that Nixon and other leaders in U.S. Congress intended to take more of a reserved approach to space 
exploration. The extravagant spending of the Apollo era was over. As space became less of a national 
priority, the American space program truly was “normalized” under Nixon, and NASA became more like 
a regular governmental domestic program, and less of an extension of national image. Nixon had come to 
the conclusion that the Nation and the national budget could not afford ambitious steps toward the future 
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in space exploration,47 and instead decided upon a path that would keep U.S. space endeavors confined to 
low Earth orbit. The American public, he decided, favored other national priorities over space.48 The U.S. 
viewed the Space Race as “won” after Apollo 11, and Nixon and the majority of his policy and budget 
advisors did not believe it was necessary to continue high-cost space missions to generate American 
prestige and pride.49 In this way, Nixon chose to look inward toward home, rather than outward into 
space. 
 The decline of space as a national priority reflected many competing priorities both at home and 
abroad, including an active civil rights movement and the controversial Vietnam War – both of which 
coincided with a reduced sense of nationalism by many Americans and a broad distrust in national 
leadership. The separation between space and national prestige also reflected a shifting perspective in 
American society, which valued international cooperation over competition.50 International collaboration 
in space once again resurfaced as a goal under Nixon, perhaps due to his “global” designs for his 
presidency and his desire to appeal to the international community as a peacemaker. Speaking before the 
United Nations General Assembly on September 18th, 1969, Nixon advocated for the internationalizing 
of space, stating that the United States would take “positive, concrete steps” to bring the joys of space 
exploration to many other nations.51 
 Keeping the focus toward Earth, NASA under the Nixon administration began preparations for 
developing a space station. However, there was much confusion surrounding the project, and no long-
term strategy for use of the shuttle that would transport astronauts to and from the space station.52 This 
wasn’t so much the fault of Nixon himself or his administration, but due to the uncertainty of NASA as it 
adjusted to this new era of space exploration. In contrast to the Apollo days, there was a lack of a concrete 
goal, and therefore it was difficult to organize a motivational project reminiscent of the race to the moon. 
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Under Nixon, space was to be a normal aspect of life,53 and would lose the sense of grandeur it 
had in the Kennedy period. Nixon explained that the United States space program would not take money 
away from other Earth-based government programs, and therefore was subject to budget cuts.54 The space 
program floundered and fell on the backburner, and these cuts set the stage for NASA trying to 
accomplish too much with too little55 - a situation that still plagues NASA’s current fiscal environment. 
Pioneering the frontier of space was not part of Nixon’s “strategic vision for America,”56 and the 
uncertainty of America’s future in space continues to be felt in American space exploration today. 
Therefore, in many ways the Nixon administration set the stage for how space exploration in the United 
States occurs today. 
REAGAN AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF SPACE 
 After Nixon’s “normalization” of U.S. space exploration, in which the administration pulled back 
on the extravagant rhetoric of earlier decades, the Reagan administration took Nixon’s methods one step 
further, and began the trend of U.S. space activities in which commercial and economic motivations 
struggled with the past goals of national prestige. With Reagan’s idea of outer space as the “new 
frontier”57 of economic development, two driving concepts of NASA took precedence: the 
commercialization of space, and interest in international collaboration. Commercialization efforts in space 
would be an area in which the U.S. could demonstrate the superiority of the American character and 
economically improve the Nation, and international collaboration would be the avenue in which the U.S. 
was to do just this.58 
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When Reagan took office, public opinion toward space exploration in the U.S. was “generally, 
but not overwhelmingly, positive.”59 Initially, following Reagan’s election, NASA officials were excited 
to once again have a president who seemed to support the space program wholeheartedly, and hoped for a 
figure reminiscent of Kennedy to lead the program. However, although Reagan did work to revitalize the 
U.S. space program and stressed the importance of space as a “new frontier,” conflicting messages 
created internal issues within NASA. Although Kennedy had once stated that the U.S. would get to the 
moon “no matter the cost,” this rationale was no longer justifiable. Reflecting Reagan’s own perspective 
on government as a whole, his administration focused on cost effectiveness and reducing government 
spending in space. However, he still called for expansive leaps into the future in space technology, which 
created pressure within NASA to produce successes that garnered public support, but with a smaller 
budget. 
 Construction on the space shuttle program dominated space activities under Reagan. However, 
funding for NASA neither “soared nor stopped”60 under Reagan, and after Nixon’s budget cuts, this 
created problems for the expensive program. There was a need to justify work on the shuttle program as a 
cheap alternative to a larger project such as exploring Mars, and therefore, NASA often oversold the cost 
effectiveness of the program.61 Due to the expectation that more could be achieved for less, NASA 
underestimated what the actual costs of the program would be, thereby ensuring that not only would the 
program go over budget, but also that it would be underfunded.62 The result of the uncertainty and 
underfunding of the shuttle project was internal conflict among NASA officials, and a “bad culture” in the 
U.S. space program. 
 The Challenger disaster, which occurred on January 28th, 1986 and involved an explosion of the 
rocket on initial launch, as well as the death of the astronauts on board, had a profound effect on attitudes 
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toward space exploration in the United States. A Congressional investigative task group, known as the 
Rogers Commission, was charged with the task of understanding the causes of the accident. The group 
reported that that although the accident itself was caused by an equipment failure, the larger cause of the 
disaster was a style of decision-making within NASA, in which officials at the top of the command chain 
were willing to compromise safety for better overall results. The report concluded: 
 
Pressures within NASA to attempt to evolve from [a research and development] agency into a 
quasi-competitive business operation caused a realignment of priorities in the direction of 
productivity at the cost of safety.63 
 
 One member of the commission, physicist Richard Feynman, was particularly critical of the 
decision-making gap between NASA management and NASA engineers. In an appendix to the report, he 
explained that there was a willingness of the management to ignore safety recommendations made by the 
engineers on the shuttle.64 Instead, NASA officials had a “fantastical faith” in the project that was not 
only unrealistic, but later resulted in the loss of lives when Challenger exploded.65 
 As the justification of space exploration as a means to promote U.S. national prestige and enforce 
competition with the Soviet Union faded into rhetoric of the past, there was a need for a new rationale. 
The economic promise of outer space became an important motivator for U.S. space exploration under the 
Reagan administration, but also created a culture within the U.S. space program that pushed for rapid, 
quick successes at the expense of safety measures. As NASA took on more of a “business” atmosphere, 
while also working under conflicting messages from the top, the American space program fell prey to a 
common theme that is found in big businesses – disasters when there is a disconnect between 
management and those that enact policy statements. Gone were the days of unified goals and motivations, 
and instead the U.S. entered into the era of American space exploration in which the future was clouded 
rather than clear.   
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SPACE EXPLORATION IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA (1991-TODAY) 
 The aftermath of the success of the Apollo missions left the United States as the perceived 
“winners” of the Space Race, but rather than serving to encourage the American space program to 
continue making monumental achievements in space, Apollo and the “lavishness” of the Kennedy era 
became a benchmark to hold up as a comparison to the relative frugality of the modern era. The United 
States moved into the next stage of American space exploration, in which NASA was stretched to achieve 
similar accomplishments to the lunar landings, but a lacking budget and decreasing public interest. This 
mindset of “a lot with little” began in the Nixon and Reagan administrations, and continued to dominate 
decades to come. 
 In the post-Cold War era, the United States struggles to decipher its identity as a space-
conquering nation. It hesitates to relinquish its status as the preeminent leader, but yet is also unwilling to 
commit to space on the same level as the Apollo period. What does the United States want from space 
exploration in the future? This next section explores the modern period of U.S. space exploration, and 
investigates the current struggles found in the American space program.  
GEORGE H. W. BUSH AND THE SPACE EXPLORATION INITIATIVE 
 As the Cold War came to an end, so did an American space program that centered on goals of 
competition and prestige. By the end of the Reagan era, NASA found itself in the midst of competing 
goals that pulled the program in many directions, thereby stagnating progress. 
When George H. W. Bush took office, he did attempt his own tactic at moving the American 
space program forward. In 1989, he announced his Space Exploration Initiative (SEI), which would return 
America to the Moon by 2000 to establish a lunar base, and, then utilizing the space station program that 
he had inherited from Reagan, launch a mission to explore Mars by 2010. Bush called the plan a “national 
priority,” referencing back to the Kennedy era and calling upon the old mentality of American 
nationalism united behind space progress.66 Congress, however, was still deeply rooted in the budget 
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concerns of the past decade, and reacted negatively to the proposal, completely refusing support. Bush 
continued to push for funding, but to no avail. Ragsdale explains: 
 
In its support of the Moon-Mars project, the Bush administration appeared to be offering 
a plan not just about big science, but about biggest science. Yet it did so with little 
attention to politics. It attempted to bring the space program full circle back to the early 
1960s. It was attempting to recreate space policy as primary policy, which would involve 
a bold, expensive, and consensual priority. Yet in the political climate of the early 1990s, 
the boldness and expense of the Moon-Mars plan ensured that it would be anything but 
consensual.67 
 
 The problem was that although Bush laid out a vision for the future of America’s space program, 
his vision was not entirely concrete and relatively difficult to pin down into one coherent message. Bush 
administration leaders were simply not as focused as leaders those the Kennedy and Johnson eras, and 
although Bush went to great lengths to rejuvenate U.S. space exploration, the overall atmosphere had 
vastly changed. In his initiative, Bush called for Americans to return to the moon, and to explore Mars - 
the desired successor to the moon. He maintained interest in the development of the new space station 
program, reasserting America’s interest in leading the global space exploration effort. But with these 
large, expansive goals, Bush’s message was filled with conflicting rhetoric of both looking behind to the 
past, and forward toward the future.68  
 Overall, the SEI had the kind of forward-looking thinking and ambitious perspective that gets 
people excited about the American space program, but it fell short of an explanation of how America 
would make the needed progress to achieve its lofty stated goals. Still, Bush retained the usual political 
rhetoric regarding space exploration in the United States, touting American leadership and excellence. 
About the SEI, Bush advocated that despite the challenges of the SEI, the American people would rise 
above those challenges because it was the Nation’s “destiny to lead.”69 
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 Even if the president demonstrated a desire to revitalize the U.S. space program with ambitious 
rhetoric that referenced back to the Apollo days, it simply lacked the clarity, as well as the budget, that 
both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations benefited from. Bush’s rallying words alone were not 
enough to jump start the program into the future, and because of this lack of follow-through within his 
own administration, the SEI as a framework did not survive to the following administration. Without a 
concrete plan that fell in line with budget realities and the attitudes of NASA and Congress officials, 
when the Clinton administration evaluated the state of NASA, it would create its own plan rather than 
follow that of its predecessor. 
CLINTON AND THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION 
By the time Bill Clinton arrived in the White House, critics argued that America’s space program 
had lost its direction. Concerns over resource availability and the need to justify cost effectiveness in 
NASA also continued, along with an overall sense of stagnation. The United States space program was 
finding it difficult to rally the same amount of support it had in the past. Indeed, even the space station 
project, originally proposed by Reagan as the Space Station Freedom, came close to being canceled by 
Congress over budget concerns.70 However, after reducing costs and announcing the inclusion of the new, 
post-Soviet Union Russia, construction finally began under the Clinton administration, and Freedom 
evolved into the International Space Station (ISS). 
After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the post-Cold War arena offered the opportunity for 
increased collaboration between the United States and Russia in space exploration. However, as Logsdon 
points out, the end of the Cold War didn’t necessarily end the desire for global space dominance on the 
part of the U.S. or Russia.71 Leadership in space was still an important rhetorical theme throughout the 
Clinton administration, as it was in past administrations, despite lack of actual follow-up to achieve this 
goal. However, with the construction of the ISS, the possibility of achieving more concrete space 
leadership, even in collaboration with Russia, became a realistic outcome. The ISS allowed the United 
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States to demonstrate the superiority of the American space program while also reaching out to other 
space agencies – and as the U.S. was in fact the leader in space, other nations would likely accept U.S. 
dominance over the ISS project in order to participate. Logsdon explains that the end of the Cold War 
created a “need for redefinition of the meaning of space leadership” in the United States – whether or not 
leadership simply meant being better than the Soviet Union in space, or was more complex.72 
GEORGE W. BUSH AND THE VISION FOR SPACE EXPLORATION 
 Like his father before him, George W. Bush announced his own “vision” for American space 
exploration during his presidency. He announced his Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) in 2004, 
following the Columbia disaster in 2003, in which the shuttle exploded on reentry into the Earth’s 
atmosphere, killing the astronauts on board. This was in part to encourage enthusiasm for the space 
program once again in the wake of tragedy, but also to assert his administration’s commitment to 
American leadership in space.73 However, again much like George H. W. Bush and other former U.S. 
presidents, George W. Bush’s strategy had little in terms of a coherent strategy for how to implement his 
goals. Critics argued that the VSE was too similar to other past unfulfilled “vision” statements, and once 
again provided poor specific direction for NASA. It reiterated Moon-Mars plans, and also called for the 
completion of the ISS, as well as the retirement of the shuttle program, but was vague on the specifics.74 
More criticism drew from Bush’s emphasis on Mars, which was scorned by scientists who valued their 
work in low-Earth orbit. Abbey and Lane, summarize criticism of the VSE, which emphasized larger, 
more expensive projects into deep space: 
  
President George W. Bush’s NASA Plan, which echoed that of President George H. W. 
Bush over a decade before, is bold by any measure. It is also incomplete and unrealistic. 
It is incomplete, in part, because it raises serious questions about the future commitment 
of the United States to astronomy and to planetary, earth, and space science. It is 
unrealistic from the perspectives of cost, timetable, and technological capability. It raises 
expectations that are not matched by the Administration’s commitments. Indeed, pursuit 
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of the NASA Plan, as formulated, is likely to result in substantial harm to the U.S. space 
program.75 
 
Regardless of the feasibility of the VSE’s stated goals, just as in past administrations, NASA 
attempted to reorganized itself to encompass this new strategy.76 However, internal divisions between 
those that looked outward into space with the intent of sending manned missions, and those that continued 
the previous administrations’ focus on Earth created, once again, a conflicted environment in NASA. 
Calls for increased international collaboration in space exploration were made in Bush’s Vision 
statement, which was received with a mixed response from the global space community. However, as the 
construction of the ISS was completed under George W. Bush, international partners felt more reassured 
of U.S. commitment to the space station, and were encouraged despite initial reservations shortly 
following the VSE announcement.77 International collaboration was contingent on the future of the ISS, 
as it was the dominant U.S. space project under Bush, and his VSE offered only vague references to what 
the role of the United States might be after its completion. One fact of the VSE that particularly troubled 
NASA officials, is that with the ending of the shuttle program in 2010, the United States would be bound 
to Russian assistance in order to take American astronauts to the ISS.78 
Although international collaboration was once again on the forefront of American space 
exploration plans, this collaboration was intended to be “American-led.”79 Under George W. Bush, NASA 
began to face the struggle that it faces today - whether it will push for American leadership in space and 
miss out on collaborative possibilities, or whether it will embrace the “new paradigm” of space 
exploration that is found today, and forge ahead with other space-faring nations 
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OBAMA AND THE MOVING FRONTIER 
 In April of 2010, U.S. President Barack Obama spoke of his vision for NASA in front of an 
audience of scientists, business leaders, and politicians. As he outlined his ideas for the future of 
America’s space program, he stated: 
 
I’d like to talk about the next chapter in this story. The challenges facing our space 
program are different, and our imperatives for this program are different, than in decades 
past. We’re no longer racing against an adversary. We’re no longer competing to achieve 
a singular goal like reaching the Moon. In fact, what was once a global competition has 
long since become a global collaboration.80 
 
Here, President Obama highlights some of the key differences between the past, Cold War era of 
space exploration initiatives, and the current period of space research and development that the world is in 
today. Following up with this message, Logsdon explains that the space policy of the Obama 
Administration acknowledges that the number of nations in the space arena has developed and increased, 
and is continuing to do so, and that if the United States misses out on these critical new relationships, 
“other poles of space leadership will emerge.”81  
The largest difference between space exploration during the Cold War and space exploration 
today is simply the increase in the number of interested parties in space exploration. Space exploration 
now encompasses a multitude of participants. This includes the introduction of more nations that have 
strong space research capabilities, as well as the marrying of government-controlled space initiatives and 
assistance from private industry. The effects of globalization aren’t unique to just the field of space 
exploration - as our world gradually becomes more and more interconnected, the roles that individual 
nations play in determining international politics have been changing. Space exploration is unique in that 
it has been inherently tied to the national security interests of the United States, and we see that changes 
in space goals of the U.S. have changed along with shifts in how the U.S. operates in a globalizing world. 
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Globalization has gone hand in hand with the struggle for nations to maintain their autonomy and 
influence. Montluc explains the importance of globalization: 
 
Two overlapping forces shape our world. On the one hand, there is the dynamic of 
globalization with its well-known driving forces - financial liberalization and the 
technological revolution - bringing about interdependence and promoting networks. On 
the other hand geographical or geopolitical realities are reasserting themselves and 
causing power struggles.82 
 
Globalization in general has had a great effect on how countries conduct all research, including 
space research. This creates a situation in which space policy must balance the motivations of space 
exploration between nationalism and economic gain. In the aforementioned speech, President Obama also 
states that he wants to transform NASA into an agency that can contend in the modern era of space 
exploration.83  The realities of space exploration are changing rapidly, and now the United States, as well 
as the other nations of this world, must decide what their goals are and how they will achieve them. 
Although the overall arena of space exploration has changed quite a bit and is more muddled, 
many aspects remain as familiar echoes of the words of past administrations in the United States. Despite 
messages of international cooperation and collaboration, Obama still retains some of the same rhetoric 
from the past era of more competitive space exploration, stating his intention to maintain American space 
leadership.84 The particular national pride America has in its leadership role definitely has not diminished. 
America still continues to insist that it be the country to control peaceful operations in space, and that 
without it, space is endangered. Furthermore, current policy understands that international collaboration 
plays an important role, but that the ultimate goal of this collaboration is to have the U.S. maintain and 
even strengthen its historic leadership role in space exploration. However, these ideals often conflict with 
each other, which has led to the continuing problem of an American space program without a concrete 
direction.  
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THE NEW PARADIGM OF SPACE EXPLORATION 
The field of space exploration, as it stands today, is markedly different from the past. Space 
exploration is now truly a global enterprise, and an arena that is no longer primarily dominated by two 
parties in struggle with each other. In a sense, there is a “new paradigm” - a change in how space 
exploration is conducted, and naturally, any nation that wishes to take part in the exploration of space 
must first integrate itself successfully into this changed field. In the following section, this paper explores 
three evolving conditions of the space exploration field as a whole that help to shape current U.S. space 
policy. These three conditions are: 1) globalization and the growing presence of private industry in space 
exploration, 2) the International Space Station as a representative of international collaboration in space 
exploration with a specific look at possible Chinese participation, and 3) the framework for future 
explorative efforts to Mars. 
THE ROLE OF PRIVATE INDUSTRY IN AMERICAN SPACE LEADERSHIP 
When exploring changes in the narrative of space exploration in the United States, the role of 
private industry cannot be ignored. Motivations behind entering into the space industry can be different 
between a national government and a corporation. Given that private industry is required to make a profit, 
this sets these companies apart from government funded programs like NASA. As the prevalence and 
visibility of private industry and corporations grows in space exploration, what the United States 
identifies as its goals in space research is affected, and this shift may even force a realignment of U.S. 
goals in response. By looking at how private industry has influenced the United States, we are able see the 
struggle the U.S. is undergoing between protecting national interests and keeping up with the rapidly 
globalizing field of space science research. 
On May 24th, 2012, the commercial company SpaceX achieved something that had previously 
only been accomplished by governments.85 The company’s Dragon capsule became the first 
commercially built vehicle to deliver cargo to the International Space Station. After that day, SpaceX was 
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added to the list of entities that have launched a space capsule into orbit and successfully brought it back 
to Earth, along with United States, Russia, and China.86 Consequentially, private industry now is a force 
in space exploration on par with governmental agencies. The relationship between private industry and 
U.S. government programs in space exploration has also become closer in recent years. The increasing 
inclusion of private companies into an area previously controlled by government reflects overarching 
changes toward globalization in all sectors of society. “International collaboration” now includes many 
entities, and is not just limited to government-to-government relations. In President Barack Obama’s 
speech at the Kennedy Center regarding the future of NASA, he addressed this controversial topic and 
announced his intention to work with private business, stating: 
 
I recognize that some had said it is infeasible or unwise to work with the private sector in 
this way. I disagree. The truth is, NASA has always relied on private industry to help 
design and build the vehicles that carry astronauts to space.87 
 
The controversy lies within the separation between the motivations of a nation and a company. 
The overall goals between these two are often different - and range from political to economic. Both 
political and economic reasons are present in why humans explore space to begin with, but where a nation 
is often more concerned with its image and prestige, companies tend to focus more on profits and 
monetary benefits. Whereas corporations ultimately must focus on economic profit, government can 
instead focus on investing in broader public good. The upside to privatization of space exploration and 
technology is that while NASA funding is tied to election cycles in U.S. politics, private industry is not. 
Currently, NASA simply does not have the budget to enact all of its goals. Therefore, Administrator 
Charles Bolden has stated that the “new business model”88 for NASA includes private contractors as a 
part of the “NASA family.”89 
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 Also, within the United States, there are governmental barriers to a flourishing space research 
industry. The presence of International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) is one significant barrier. 
ITAR was initially enacted in 1976, during the Cold War, in order to implement control over arms 
exports. However, in recent years, ITAR has meant that it is exceedingly difficult for international 
collaboration to take place between organizations within the United States and those of other nations, as 
there are stringent regulations surrounding what types of information can and cannot be shared. Blount 
gives this explanation of ITAR: 
 
ITAR is a group of export control regulations that were adopted under the Arms Export 
Control Act. The Act allows the government to control the export of defense items, 
services, and technical data to other nations, and ITAR is the implementation of these 
controls. The policy behind ITAR is to further “world peace and security.” The crucial 
section of ITAR is the United States Munitions List (USML), which designates, in 
twenty-one categories, articles and data that are considered to be defense items. If an 
object is found on the USML, it and data about it will require licensing by the 
Department of State’s Director of Defense Trade Controls before the item can be 
exported. Of particular interest to practitioners in the space industry are items such as 
launchers and propellants; however, the inclusion of spacecraft and commercial satellites 
create the largest problems for the industry.90 
 
ITAR means international collaboration in the space industry is a very long process that not only 
makes it difficult for civil space programs to cooperate with foreign programs,91 but also poses a threat to 
American competitiveness in the space industry. Although the regulations are present for compelling 
reasons, and there have been efforts to lessen the strictness of ITAR in recent years, ITAR also hinders 
the growth of space industry-related business in the United States. Due to the stringent regulations and 
difficulty in getting through all of the processes of ITAR, the presence of ITAR “raises the cost of doing 
business across the board, which often sends investors to other sources for technology, and it can 
effectively bar small entrepreneurial business from entering into international markets.”92 Longstanding 
companies like Boeing have the ability to navigate through ITAR, but small businesses or firms may not 
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be able to do so. ITAR not only results in missed opportunities in the realm of international collaboration 
between government, but also for industry in the U.S. 
THE POLITICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION: A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE 
 No look into international collaboration in space would be complete without considering the role 
of the International Space Station (ISS). As the ISS came about at the beginning of the post-Cold War era 
of space exploration, it serves as a good case study for how politics and national interests determine what 
enacted policy looks like in real-life examples. Because of the structure of the ISS and how it is utilized 
by several different space agencies from a variety of nations, the ISS has been considered “a litmus test of 
international space cooperation.”93 China serves as an interesting lens in this case, as they have recently 
indicated interest in joining other agencies on the ISS, and were declined by the United States.  
Before the first component of the International Space Station was launched into low Earth orbit in 
1998, the project was put forth during the Reagan Administration, then known as Space Station Freedom 
(SSF), and was intended to be an international project headed by the U.S. from the very beginning. The 
initial international partners sought out by NASA were the European Space Agency (ESA), the Canadian 
Space Agency (CSA), and the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). During the beginnings of 
the ISS project, NASA’s interaction with the involved foreign space agencies centered around NASA 
dominating the bilateral or multilateral agreements, and maintaining most of the control over the entire 
project. This strategy meant that the United States intended to keep its leadership status in space 
exploration,94 but international collaboration was still valuable to the priorities of the U.S. when it came to 
the space missions that the United States wished to implement.95 After the fall of the Soviet Union, the 
Russian Space Agency (RSA) was added to the list of partners and the project became what we know 
today, the ISS. Just as Russia was added to ISS after several years of established planning and framework, 
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it is possible in the future that there will be more space agencies added to this symbol of international 
cooperation in space.  
Recently, China has indicated its interest in joining other nations on the ISS,96 which due to the 
politics of the day, has been denied by the United States, despite China’s rapid technological development 
in space exploration.97 The United States claims it is for reasons of national security that it opposes 
collaboration with China in space exploration.98 In this way, China has come to replace the former Soviet 
Union in American security calculations and concerns.99 Despite reassurances by China that its interest in 
space is peaceful in nature, the fact that the country’s political decision-making is “notoriously opaque,” 
means that other countries have difficulty in deciphering China’s true goals.100 Additionally, missile tests 
made by China in space, including the anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) test in 2007 in which China 
launched a ballistic missile at an out-of-operation weather satellite, resulting in a massive amount of space 
debris, give cause to the international community to question Chinese intentions in space.101  
However, some authors have challenged the argument that countries like the U.S. have purely 
scientific or peaceful intentions behind their interest in space, while China is more nefarious. Security 
concerns were present in the past when the U.S. opened up to more collaboration with Russia, yet the 
collaboration led to a number of successes on projects like the ISS. Seedhouse explains that despite the 
risks, China’s motivations for building up its own national space program is an attempt to “reap all the 
benefits” that the United States achieved during the Apollo era – benefits which include domestic pride, 
international prestige, and economic development.102 Hilborne also recommends that for the benefit of 
both parties, the U.S. and China should overcome their differences. One difference is that Russia joined 
the ISS at a time when the country was economically vulnerable, which influenced its decision to team up 
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with its old rival.103 However, China’s is currently in a position where its economic capabilities are 
increasing, including in space endeavors.104 Where it was once in Russia’s best interests to join the ISS, it 
now may be in the best interests of the rest of the world to invite China to participate on the ISS. T reality 
is the field of space exploration has changed. The United States is in a position to recognize this, to 
establish common ground in security concerns, and to encourage broad participation by other nations, 
which may require establishing a beneficial relationship with China in space. 
LOOKING AHEAD: MARS AND THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN SPACE PROGRAM 
 NASA has recently identified Mars as the new “Moon,” or the new larger goal for the space 
program. What will it take to achieve this ambition? It is generally accepted that as the arena of space 
exploration develops and becomes more complex, involving more participating agencies and interested 
parties, future space missions will naturally become more reflective of this diverse field, becoming more 
“international” in nature and scope. It is also expected that space industry will continue to have an 
invaluable role in future space missions, more so than it has had in the past. As the global space-faring 
community looks toward the future, it often looks to Mars.  
Shaghaghi and Antonakopoulos identify the groups or “stakeholders” that have an important role 
in future missions to Mars. They identified 13 stakeholders, ranging from governments to cultural 
institutions.105 This demonstrates how space exploration is currently a complex endeavor, incorporating 
many different perspectives and backgrounds. The authors also argue that large-scale missions to Mars, 
like a settlement missions, would only be possible on a worldwide scale in terms of cooperation, and 
therefore international collaboration is essential to the success of the mission.106 No one nation singularly 
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has preeminence over the technology needed for a manned mission to Mars, which means that global 
cooperation is imperative to the future of space exploration.107 
The question is whether NASA recognizes and accepts this imperative. In NASA’s statement on 
its plan for future manned missions to Mars, many references to international collaboration are made, 
with phrases like “NASA and its partners,” occurring frequently. International collaboration is also 
identified as a strategic principle,108 demonstrating NASA’s recognition of cooperation between nations 
as essential to successful missions to Mars. Additionally, the crucial use of the ISS as a stepping stone 
toward Mars acknowledges the importance of the international relationships already established.109 NASA 
also identifies the importance of U.S. space industry in efforts to Mars.110 SpaceX is mentioned 
specifically as an instrumental part of launching U.S. spacecrafts into orbit,111 demonstrating the 
importance of private industry in U.S. space efforts.  
 However, despite a framework that demonstrates interconnectedness and complexity, NASA is 
still determined to remain the leader in space exploration.112 The word of the day seems to be “pioneer,” 
which makes repeat appearances in NASA’s publication of its strategy to Mars. NASA continues to 
operate under the belief that it can both be a leader and a participant on the global journey to Mars. The 
struggle between maintaining leadership and encouraging collaboration will be examined in Part II of this 
paper.
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PART II: CONTENT ANALYSIS 
CONTENT ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
In order to investigate how the narrative of space exploration has changed over time, this paper 
looked at the policies and rhetoric concerning U.S. space exploration across eight U.S. presidential 
administrations, from the Cold War era to today. It specifically examined three areas of space exploration 
rhetoric: policy releases from various presidential administrations, statements made by those presidents 
and other prominent voices in space exploration leadership, and policy recommendations made to the 
U.S. government for advised action in space exploration. By looking at these three areas, this paper was 
able to examine a broad range of space exploration rhetoric, from official policy to leadership attitudes. 
Policy releases represent what the current U.S. administration wishes to present as its official goals for 
space exploration, leadership statements in speeches or interviews reveal more of the biases and attitudes 
concerning space exploration development, and policy recommendations demonstrate how individuals in 
the current administration wish to move forward in space exploration endeavors. These three aspects of 
U.S. rhetoric concerning space exploration added up to a larger picture of overall attitudes and intent 
regarding space exploration on the part of the United States, which traces the evolution of the overall 
narrative of space exploration in the U.S. 
 To more rigorously evaluate how the rhetoric and priorities of space exploration in the United 
States have changed throughout the course of space history in the United States. The documents used in 
this paper were subjected to a content analysis using five general themes (Table 1). The method of content 
analysis was chosen to analyze space policy documentation, because it is a useful tool for identifying how 
different patterns emerge over time from a larger body of material. Content analysis is used when 
examining how language embodies intent, attitudes, and biases beyond its literal textual meaning. Wodak 
writes that the analysis of overarching patterns within the content of text or speech is used to “focus on 
larger units than isolated words and sentences,”113 in order to examine the content as a whole to derive 
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meaning. 114 She adds that this method of analysis can “address the causes and consequences of historical 
change.”115 By focusing on the presence or absence of certain themes within these documents, historical 
changes emerged that can be interpreted as an evaluation of policy rhetoric surrounding the role of space 
exploration in the U.S. over the course of time. 
 The five themes were chosen for coding within the content analysis after an initial read-through 
of the selected documents. Some themes, such as competition with the Soviet Union and international 
collaboration, were obvious choices for the study. As an objective technique, however, the content 
analysis method helps in evaluating whether there was a direct evolution from competition to 
collaboration, and if there were other factors or themes that were more dominant in U.S. space policy than 
originally suspected. Another interesting question was if there was a linear evolution that could be traced 
from one theme to another, or if the evolution of space exploration in the United States was more 
complicated and complex. Because space exploration is used as a political tool in the United States, some 
of the changes may not be immediately obvious or straightforward. Therefore, in addition to revealing 
some obvious trends that either increased or decreased over time, the method might aid in understanding 
some of the nuances of space exploration history.  
Other themes such as prestige, leadership, and the evolution of the space exploration field itself 
emerged after the initial read-through. Once the five themes were identified, each document was coded 
for them and tallies taken for how many times each theme occurred within the document. Those numbers 
then added up to total counts per theme per administration. This provides the data for the results and 
analysis section of Part II. 
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Content Analysis Themes 
Theme Rhetoric/Attitude/Goals 
1: Competition 
with the Soviet 
Union 
● the United States is in direct competition with the Soviet Union, which extends out into the 
field of space exploration  
● the Soviet Union, in developing their own space technologies, influence the decision making 
of the United States in its respective space endeavors 
● the United States needs to “beat” the Soviet Union in space exploration 
● successful efforts of the Soviet Union in space exploration have a psychological impact on 
the rest of the world and increase their own prestige 
2: American 
Prestige 
● the actions of the United States in the field of space exploration are directly tied to the 
American persona 
● American nationalism is tied to accomplishments in space exploration 
● achievements in space exploration are a source of prestige for the United States 
● it is important to achieve successes in space exploration for the psychological benefits, and in 
order to increase American prestige 
3: International 
Collaboration 
● there is collaboration or cooperation with other international space agencies on the part of the 
United States 
● there is a goal of partnering with international collaborators on space-related projects 
● international collaboration is important to U.S. interests in space exploration 
4: American 
Leadership 
● the U.S. is and/or has been a leader in the space field 
● there is a goal of maintaining American leadership in space exploration 
● space will be a peaceful arena with American leadership 
● the United States will continue paving the way for space exploration globally 
5: A New 
Paradigm 
● there is the sense of a new era of space exploration 
● the space exploration field is a multi-national arena that encompasses many players, rather 
than the traditional bipolar relationship between the U.S. and Russia 
● space exploration is a changing field that does not resemble the past 
 
Table 1. Five themes were used for the content analysis of U.S. policy releases, leadership statements, and 
policy recommendations related to space exploration within eight administrations from the Cold War to 
today. 
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Theme 1: Competition with the Soviet Union. Because the decision of the United States to 
develop its own space program was largely influenced by the Soviet Union’s own endeavors in space 
technology, references to direct competition with the U.S.S.R. are important to track. Theme 1 also 
includes rhetoric that incites a sense of needing to “beat” the Soviet Union in space technology and 
exploration, or statements made about the space program of the Soviet Union in a competitive context. 
Mentions of the successes of the Soviet Union in space as having a deep psychological impact on the 
United States and, in a sense, even scaring the United States also falls under this theme. 
Theme 2: American Prestige. American nationalism in space exploration, and rhetorical 
references to prestige is another important theme that set a precedent for the U.S. space program, and 
success in space exploration is often used to demonstrate strength or superiority. This theme includes 
statements that link the American persona and space exploration, encourage psychological dominance 
over others by the United States as the result of successful space endeavors, and advocate for the pursuit 
of American beliefs and values through space exploration. 
Theme 3: International Collaboration. This theme includes specific calls for international 
collaboration or cooperation in space exploration and technology between the United States and at least 
one other space-faring nation or agency. It also includes statements that encourage collaboration and 
cooperation as beneficial for the United States in its own efforts in space.  
Theme 4: American Leadership. Statements about the United States as a stated leader of the 
development of humanity’s efforts in space include the U.S. achieving or preserving a commanding 
leadership role. Leadership should not be confused with competition, as it is much broader and 
encompasses the betterment of all. 
Theme 5: A New Paradigm. This theme is perhaps the most complicated, and includes mentions 
of a new paradigm of space exploration. In this context, paradigm means how the Nation and the world 
view the overall field of space exploration as a whole. Preferences to the changing field of space 
exploration, or the inclusion of new players in this field, were identified and coded. This theme 
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acknowledges a change from the past rhetoric of space exploration, to statements of the new goals and 
intentions for what the United States desires to achieve for the future in space. 
For the content analysis, five documents each were selected from eight U.S. presidential 
administrations (within the years that each president held office). Each document fit into one of three 
categories: policy release, leadership rhetoric, or policy recommendation. A list of the specific 
administrations and the documents examined are given in the Appendix. 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
RESULTS 
 Using the five themes given in Table 1, a clear picture emerges of how U.S. goals and rhetoric in 
the field of space exploration and technology have developed and changed since the inception of the 
American space program. The raw counts of each theme, per each of the eight administrations, from the 
content analysis are shown in Table 2 and are depicted as a histogram in Figure 1. 
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Counts of Thematic References in Analyzed Documents for Each Administration 
 Theme 1 
Competition 
with the Soviet 
Union 
Theme 2 
American 
Prestige 
Theme 3 
International 
Collaboration 
Theme 4 
American 
Leadership 
Theme 5 
A New 
Paradigm 
Eisenhower 
Administration 
21 11 12 1 0 
Kennedy 
Administration 
10 4 4 10 0 
Nixon 
Administration 
10 7 12 6 0 
Reagan 
Administration 
3 6 26 23 6 
Bush Sr. 
Administration 
0 11 18 16 17 
Clinton 
Administration 
0 3 15 5 3 
Bush Jr. 
Administration 
0 4 14 2 5 
Obama 
Administration 
0 4 12 16 11 
 
Table 2. Content analysis results depicted as a table of the raw counts for each identified theme, showing 
the number of references in each of the five themes within the categories of policy documents, policy 
recommendations, and leadership statements for eight U.S. presidencies. 
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Figure 1. Content analysis results depicted as a histogram, showing the evolution of the identified themes 
throughout each of the eight administrations. The histogram demonstrates trends for certain themes, such 
as a decrease in competition over time and an increase in a new paradigm of space exploration. Other 
themes, such as prestige, collaboration, and leadership, are more complicated and do not show obvious 
trends. 
 
While some simple trends are apparent in the data, such as the dominance of competition as a 
theme in early U.S. space program rhetoric and the emergence of the theme of a new paradigm in later 
years, the results show that space exploration rhetoric is complex and varies greatly from one 
administration to another. Each of the themes is analyzed in detail in the following section. 
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ANALYSIS 
The rhetoric of space exploration is complicated and varies greatly from administration to 
administration. Each new U.S. president sets out their own goals for space exploration, and there is 
variation and, in some cases, conflicting messages. Some administrations may desire to increase 
American prestige and leadership in space exploration, while others seek to reach other to other space-
faring nations and develop collaborative ties. The analysis of these themes reveals how space exploration 
is an arena where many different, sometimes mutually exclusive, ideals and values interact and conflict 
with each other. Understanding the development of these themes is important to understanding the 
development of the symbol of space exploration in the United States as a whole. 
 
Theme 1: Competition with the Soviet Union 
 Competition is more prevalent in earlier administrations, and gradually decreases over time 
before it disappears completely during the Post Cold-War period. It begins at its peak of twenty-one 
counts during the Eisenhower administration, decreasing to ten counts in both the Kennedy and Nixon 
administration, then to three counts in the Reagan administration, and then disappears as a rhetorical 
theme from the Bush Sr. administration to the present. It is the dominant theme in the Eisenhower 
administration, is tied for most references with Theme 4 (leadership) in the Kennedy administration, 
maintains the same count but comes after Theme 3 (collaboration) in the Nixon administration, and falls 
to last place in the Reagan administration. 
 The space exploration narrative begins with a strong presence of Theme 1 in the Eisenhower, 
Kennedy, and Nixon administrations. The psychological impact of the Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik 1 
is evident in the Eisenhower era, and despite President Eisenhower’s dismissal of the Sputnik successes 
as anything prolific, competition with the Soviet Union dominates early American efforts in space 
exploration. Well before the launch of the world’s first space satellite, the National Security Council 
brought recent Soviet activities in developing space technology to Eisenhower’s attention and explained 
that future explorations into space would be a race against the Soviet Union that the United States could 
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not afford to lose.116 After Eisenhower, the Kennedy administration fully embraced the Space Race, and 
set out to specifically match or exceed the Soviets’ space program.117 And in the Nixon era, Congress 
requested an entire study titled, “United States and Soviet Rivalry in Space: Who Is Ahead, and How Do 
the Contenders Compare” in order to determine who had the upper hand in space exploration. 
 In the earlier days of U.S. space efforts, space exploration served as a competitive proxy between 
the United States and the Soviet Union, symbolizing the general competitiveness that was the Cold War. 
The presidents and policymakers of these eras were unable to escape the overall atmosphere of “beat the 
Soviets,” and even if the Soviet Union was not explicitly mentioned when space exploration goals were 
stated, the Cold War and competition with the Soviet Union was heavily embedded in the American 
psyche. 
 
Theme 2: American Prestige 
 American prestige stays consistent throughout all administrations as a relevant theme, but slightly 
decreases over time. It starts off in the Eisenhower administration with eleven counts, and drops a little bit 
to between four to seven counts for the following three administrations. It gains momentum in the George 
H. W. Bush administration with eleven counts again, but drops back down again to low numbers for the 
following three administrations. It is never the most prominent theme in any administration, and is always 
in 3rd or 4th place. 
 The consistent presence of Theme 2 in space exploration rhetoric directly demonstrates how 
space exploration serves a metaphorical purpose in the United States. Space exploration successes are 
often used as a symbol of the strength of American ideals and values, and those successes bring prestige 
to the American persona. As a theme it peaks during the Eisenhower and Bush Sr. administrations. 
During the Eisenhower era, the United States was predominantly reacting to recent Soviet Union 
advances in space technology - specifically the launch of Sputnik 1. While Eisenhower himself gave little 
                                               
116 National Security Council, “Statement of Policy on U.S. Scientific Satellite Program (NSC 5520),” (1955), 11. 
117 The Brookings Institution, “Proposed Studies on Implications of Peaceful Space Activities for Human Affairs,” 
(1961), 190. 
 Holland 45 
attention to this event, his administration was well aware of the psychological benefits of being the first 
nation to launch a satellite, and related this back to the need of the U.S. to improve its own international 
image with successes in space. Before the launch of Sputnik 1, as both the United States and the Soviet 
Union were making preparations for launching satellites during the International Geophysical Year, the 
National Security Council found that “considerable prestige and psychological benefits will accrue to the 
nation which first is successful in launching a satellite.”118 After the Soviet Union achieved those 
psychological benefits, the Council acknowledged that the Soviet Union had surpassed the United States 
in terms of prestige119 and advised that the United States should work to improve its own image as a 
successful space-faring nation.120 
 After a handful of presidential administrations and impressive U.S. space missions like Apollo, 
the George H. W. Bush administration had the ability to look back on 30 years of history in space 
exploration in the United States with praise. He was fully aware that space exploration served as a symbol 
of American prestige and was proud of America’s space exploration program, which he acknowledged in 
his speeches on the 20th anniversary of the Apollo 11 moon landing.121122 However, at this point in time, 
the United States was beginning to look to the future in order to plan ahead, but maintaining American 
prestige in space was revealed to be an important goal during the George H. W. Bush administration.  
 
Theme 3: International Collaboration 
 International collaboration is an important theme throughout all administrations, and, as a theme, 
becomes slightly more prevalent over time. This theme reaches its peak in the Reagan administration at 
twenty-six counts, and is at its lowest in the Kennedy administration at four counts. Within the Kennedy 
administration, it is tied for lowest along with prestige. As a general trend it becomes more of a 
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dominating theme in later administrations, where it is the most frequently occurring theme from the 
Nixon to the George W. Bush administrations. 
 Surprisingly, international collaboration as a theme is not only always present in U.S. space 
policy, even during the earlier days of competition with the Soviet Union, but also dominates rhetoric 
during the Cold War era administrations of Nixon and Reagan. The earlier rhetoric of international 
collaboration is generally limited to calls for collaboration with “friendly” countries to the United States. 
However occasional bones were tossed out to the Soviet Union for exchange of some minimal technical 
data123 within the Kennedy administration. Eisenhower instead focused on the scientific community as the 
arena for collaboration,124 rather than space agency to space agency. 
 Under Nixon and Reagan, Theme 3 becomes the key theme in space exploration rhetoric. As the 
Cold War reaches its height, America looks to its allies to maintain momentum against the Soviet Union 
in space endeavors. Nixon himself stated he believed that the successes of space exploration “should be 
shared by all peoples,”125 and Reagan reiterated this sentiment during his 1984 State of the Union Address 
when he stated, “NASA will invite other countries to participate so we can strengthen peace, build 
prosperity, and expand freedom for all who share our goals.”126 The most important American goal during 
this period of history is without a doubt, to achieve advantage over the Soviet Union. 
However once the Soviet Union falls and begins to look less like an enemy and more like a 
possible partner, Russia is included in this list of possible partnerships for milestone space exploration 
endeavors like the Space Station Freedom (or as it is later to be known, the International Space Station). 
Theme 3 maintains its importance over time as globalization and the increasing number of space-faring 
nations necessitates international collaboration. This theme dominates rhetoric by a wide margin during 
the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, where the construction and assembly of the 
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International Space Station is paramount. By the modern period, the emphasis has shifted away from 
projects that will gain America prestige, toward projects that will benefit the international community.  
 
Theme 4: American Leadership 
American leadership is a present theme throughout all administrations, and also becomes slightly 
more prevalent over time. It is at its lowest with one count in the Eisenhower administration, and peaks in 
the Reagan administration at twenty-three counts. It is quite variable as a theme and it is more important 
within the Kennedy, Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and Obama administrations, than in the Eisenhower, 
Nixon, Clinton, and George W. Bush administrations. 
 Theme 4 is closely tied to Theme 2, so like the theme of prestige, leadership is a theme that is 
constantly present in space exploration rhetoric. In the Kennedy administration, Theme 4 ties with Theme 
1 in terms of relevance, demonstrating that not only does the U.S. view space exploration as a competition 
with the Soviet Union, but that there is also the goal of becoming the leader of the field. Retrospectively, 
this makes sense, as space exploration was a bipolar arena between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. As the 
number of space-faring nations increases, we might expect Theme 4 to decrease. However, this proves not 
to be the case, and Theme 4 actually increases over time after the Nixon administration. Its peaks in the 
Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations are due to the fact that the United States is enjoying its 
established leadership role in space exploration, and seeks to maintain this role and exert dominance over 
the Soviet Union. Reagan remarks that “being a leader in space is a very wonderful accomplishment,”127 
and the National Space Council under the Bush Sr. administration advocates that the “fundamental 
objective” of U.S. efforts in space exploration is leadership.128   
 
Theme 5: A New Paradigm 
 A “new paradigm,” as a theme, is absent during the Cold War period, and only appears during the 
post-Cold War period. It first appears during the Reagan administration with the begin of the fall of the 
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Soviet Union, reaching its peak in the following George H. W. Bush administration and staying present 
within the next three administrations as well. It is less of a pressing theme in the Clinton and George W. 
Bush administrations, but rises during the Obama administration. 
 Theme 5 is entirely absent during the Cold War era, as not only is this a period in which the status 
quo is competition between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., but the United States does not yet have the history 
to draw comparison between the past and the present. It first appears as a theme during the Reagan 
administration, at the tail end of the Cold War, when the National Commission on Space explained that 
power in space was rapidly proliferating as more and more nations made significant advances in space 
exploration with their own space capabilities.129 Theme 5 reaches its peak under the George H. W.  Bush 
administration, directly after the fall of the Soviet Union and when the world is in the post-Cold War 
shock. As the United States grapples for where it needs to head in the future in order to achieve its 
designated space exploration goals, it acknowledges that this is no longer as simple as beating out one 
identified rival. Additionally, the increasing importance of private industry in space exploration adds to 
the complexity of space exploration as a field. Globalization not only complicates the arena with the 
inclusion of more players, but also competing interests in the industrial side. 
Under the Obama administration, the president fully acknowledges the multipolar nature of 
modern space exploration, as well as the significant role of private industry in this field. There is a direct 
comparison to the past in our current era, where our challenges are now different,130 and 50 years after the 
establishment of NASA, the space exploration narrative has evolved significantly.131 
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DISCUSSION 
When looking at the patterns that emerge from the five themes of the content analysis, it is 
important to consider how these themes interact with each other. Understanding this relationship allows 
us to develop a larger picture of the evolution of space exploration as a whole, with these different 
moving parts representing shifts in the interests and goals of the U.S. over time. By looking at what the 
United States currently desires to achieve in space exploration in contrast to its stated goals in the past, we 
can understand and make recommendations for how the country should move forward in the future. 
Competition becomes less present in U.S. space exploration rhetoric, other themes, like 
international collaboration, American leadership, and a new paradigm become more prevalent. It is 
plausible that the fall of the Soviet Union and American interest in partnering with the new Russia 
contributed to this shift in U.S. goals for space exploration, and later on, this interaction between 
competition and other themes could be the result of the field of space exploration becoming more 
complex and diverse.  
Another theme that fades over time is the theme of prestige, which is an important tool used by 
earlier leaders to gain the support of the American public by promoting American values through space 
exploration. Although the United States wishes to remain a leader in space exploration as time goes on, 
prestige as a theme falls to the wayside in favor of international collaboration. The rhetoric shifts from 
simply flaunting the national image to enthusiasm for Americans as helping others grow their own space 
capabilities. This transition is also related to the theme of a new paradigm. As many more interested 
parties enter into the space exploration arena, the United States makes the decision to let nationalism drop 
in favor of improving international relations and promoting leadership qualities. 
As competition and prestige disappear as relevant space exploration themes, and international 
collaboration and a new paradigm rise, one might expect that references to American leadership decreases 
as well. This makes logical sense if leadership is seen as taking a commanding role in conflict with 
collaboration. The relationship between leadership and collaboration themes is discussed further under 
Challenge 2 of this section. Curiously, under the Obama administration the theme of leadership spikes up 
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once again. This may reflect an administration trying to navigate an increasingly complex arena of space 
exploration, or may be indicative of Obama’s values and goals for his legacy. Whatever the cause, 
Obama’s 2010 National Space Policy mentions leadership as a goal six times, communicating intention to 
maintain U.S. dominance as the field of space exploration develops into the future.  
The analysis and interactions among themes point to three challenges regarding U.S. space policy 
in the current era. These three challenges are: 1) there is a disconnect between stated policy goals in 
American space exploration efforts and the implementation of those goals, 2) the United States 
communicates mixed messages regarding its intent to be both the dominant leader in the field of space 
exploration and committed as a participant in international collaboration, and 3) the United States cannot 
remain a true pioneer of space exploration if it does not embrace the realities of globalization and the 
changing dynamics within the field of space exploration. The remainder of this section focuses on each of 
these challenges in turn, and offers recommendations based on the discussion.  
CHALLENGE 1: DISCONNECT BETWEEN POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION 
As examined in the background section of this paper, after the successes of the Apollo era, the 
United States has had difficulty in clearly defining its goals in space exploration. As space policy has 
become less of a priority, commitment and follow-through with stated policy goals is often not as 
consistent as the U.S. government or NASA would like. Whereas in the past space was more of a national 
priority, today governmental politics dictate stated space policy and subsequent funding for the American 
space program. Because of this, the United States needs to make some choices concerning how it goes 
about space exploration, in order to close the gap between ambitious policy statements and the reality of 
the capabilities of NASA. 
The U.S. needs to decide how much influence it wishes to have on global space exploration. 
Throughout recent policy statements, the U.S. has reiterated its desire to maintain a leadership status in 
space. Yet realities like NASA’s current budget, as well as the general vagueness about the direction the 
U.S. space program is headed, contradict this goal. Rhetorical posturing is not a substitute for real vision 
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and commitment. Space doesn’t necessarily have to be a top priority in national policy, but if current U.S. 
administrations continue to make statements about U.S. leadership in space that are reminiscent of the 
Apollo days, the American public and the rest of the world either expect the U.S. to live up to its 
proclamations or turn away because they recognize empty promises. Increases to NASA’s budget and/or 
efforts to lay out clearly defined, effective goals for space missions would set an example to the rest of the 
world that the U.S. is serious about maintaining a leadership status in space. 
Additionally, the mentality of “bigger and better for less” that has dominated the space program 
since the end of the Apollo era is harmful in the long run. While many people argue that the Apollo 
program was unrestricted in its spending and too lavish, attempting to run more ambitious missions that 
are on the same grandiose scale as cheaply as possible could be detrimental not only to the quality of the 
American space program, but also to its reputation. If the United States is not willing to invest what is 
necessary into projects like a manned mission to Mars, then the country needs to reevaluate its goals. 
Currently, it is expected that projects will run over the budgets that were originally proposed to Congress, 
because the ambitious goals that the United States sets out to complete are not realistic for NASA’s 
current budget. One option is for the U.S. to work within its parameters and settle on less expensive, less 
extravagant projects. The U.S. could also concede unilateral control on projects with other nations in 
exchange for lower overall costs. However, if the United States desires to be a leader in space, and a 
pioneer in big, expensive projects, then the country’s space program needs to be aligned with that. Either 
way, the program needs to be reevaluated for realistic and achievable goals. 
Recommendation 1: The U.S. government and NASA should critically examine space 
exploration priorities and commit to implementing a program that will further realistic and robust stated 
policy and goals.  
CHALLENGE 2: STRUGGLE BETWEEN LEADERSHIP AND COLLABORATION 
 Both the themes of international collaboration in space and American leadership in space have 
meant different things to different people over the course of the development of space exploration in the 
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United States. They are consistently prevalent themes, but this is perhaps due to their multifaceted nature 
and ambiguity. International collaboration and leadership come into direct conflict in the modern era of 
space exploration. The end of the Cold War may have opened up the global space arena for direction 
international cooperation, but the post-Cold War era did not completely shift U.S. goals away from 
nationalism.132 As the field developed and more nations became interested in participation, the United 
States struggled and continues to struggle to balance a desire to participate in the evolving field, but also 
retain a certain amount of preeminence and control. 
Although leadership surpassed competition as the new overarching goal for U.S. space 
exploration, and leading through collaboration with other nations became a consistent goal of the U.S. 
space program, it is difficult to reconcile being a participant rather than a leader. Blamont explains 
NASA’s struggle between leadership and collaboration: 
 
For NASA “international cooperation” has generally been conceived as the acceptance by 
other partners of a programme conceived, planned and directed by NASA. As a matter of 
principle the USA does not want to relinquish responsibility for a critical element in a 
mission or program to an outside partner.133 
 
Blamont adds:  
 
Often we hear American analyses of world problems accompanied by the proposal of 
“American leadership” as a solution. This cliché frequently serves as a euphemism for 
“command.”134 
 
In the past, international collaboration in space has meant that the United States is interested in 
simple data sharing with other friendly, allied countries. The individual goals of the United States 
dominated these “collaborative” efforts, and the U.S. maintained unilateral control, but yet this can still be 
considered some measure of international cooperation. Earlier administrations viewed collaboration as an 
avenue in which the U.S. could solidify other valued goals like prestige and leadership, or further political 
interests as the atmosphere warmed between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Collaboration was not seen as a 
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benefit to scientific development and the opportunity to share scientific achievement between many 
nations for the sake of the entire world – a more modern interpretation that resonates today. 
Leadership as well has taken on many meanings over time. In the past, the United States argued 
for leadership in space for the sake of furthering political goals and American prestige. Now, as those 
specific goals are no longer relevant, NASA argues that it will “lead through cooperation.” However, this 
sentiment is somewhat of an oxymoron. Whether or not the U.S. can successfully participate in 
international collaboration in space and still act as a leader in the field is entirely contingent on its 
definition of what leadership is. If leadership means that the United States must preeminently dominate 
the arena and maintain the upper hand in international agreements, the country will not find the true 
benefits to collaboration and as a result, relationships with other space-faring nations will suffer. But if 
the country can instead find leadership to mean something more along the lines of a country that acts as a 
“leading participant,” rather than the loudest and most important voice in the room, it will find that other 
nations are more willing to partner with it.  
Indeed, the U.S. cannot ignore the realities of the space exploration field today, which is 
international and only becoming more so. To push away potential partnerships in favor of egotism would 
be a huge detriment to not only NASA itself, but also to world progress in space. It is important to find 
that balance between leader and participant. It is also important to remain open to other perspectives, and 
allow for other nations to take the critical path on missions. True leadership, after all, is not complete 
domination over other parties, but rather someone who initially provides the opportunity for others to 
participate and ensures that all voices are heard. 
Recommendation 2: The U.S. should reexamine its intention to play a dominant leadership role 
in space exploration, and consider emphasizing a commitment toward active participation in international 
collaboration in space. 
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CHALLENGE 3: EMBRACING THE NEW PARADIGM 
 The new paradigm of space exploration is one in which there are many international players, and 
in which private industry has an increasingly strong foothold. The relative role of U.S. leadership, the 
participation and role of other counties with interests in entering the space arena, along with privatization 
of space will all affect the kind of space science the U.S. conducts and in what particular aspects the U.S. 
will make trade-offs. Too much government control will limit competition, yet too much influence from 
private corporations will limit space science research only to what is commercially viable. However, it is 
clear that in order to be at the forefront of space exploration, the United States needs not only to 
participate with prominent space-faring nations, but also reduce barriers to participation in the space 
industry. To embrace the new paradigm of space exploration and abandon Cold War era thinking is key. 
One area where Cold War rhetoric still dominates is in America’s relationship with China in 
space. In this new era, China is often presented as the successor to the U.S.S.R.’s role as America’s 
“rival” in a space race.135 China and Russia share similarities in many ways, especially in terms of looking 
at how international cooperation functions in ISS-related situations.136 Examining the historical context of 
Russia’s inclusion on the ISS and initial U.S. reservations can aid in demonstrating how the United States 
could possibly extend an invitation to China,137 as well as serve to evaluate whether or not the U.S. lives 
up to its stated goals of international collaboration. While comparing the current situation with China to 
the past situation of the Soviet Union can be useful in understanding how national interests have shifted 
over time, it becomes clear that concessions likely will need to be made on part of the United States if it is 
to truly move forward in this era of globalization. Competition and rivalry in space pose a barrier to 
international collaboration and progress in space. With the state of current economic interdependence and 
a globalized world, China cannot be thought of in a simplistic, Cold War mentality.138 In his 
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recommendation for the U.S. and China to overcome their differences for the benefit of both parties, 
Hilborne states:  
 
In an age of interdependence and globalization, establishing a clear framework for space 
security is a logical step. In such an era, and in an environment that is inherently 
cooperative, competition is increasingly fruitless and impractical. Urgency is also a 
factor. If space is permitted to lapse into a competitive, possibly weaponized 
environment, it will be very difficult to reverse. To avoid this, China and the USA will 
need to manage their strategic interests.139 
 
 Another area in which the U.S. needs to embrace the new paradigm is in reconsidering and 
possibly restructuring regulations like ITAR. If international collaboration is to be the model moving 
forward for the United States, the presence of ITAR and similar regulations greatly hinders future 
successes in space exploration. Blamont explains that ITAR negatively affects collaboration by straining 
“daily working conditions” due to the “suspicious atmosphere” that the regulations cause.140 Blamont also 
hints at America’s suspicious nature when it comes to collaboration in space exploration, a carry over of 
Cold War era mentality. That mentality is not keeping up with post-Cold War realities, which impedes 
American progress in developing positive relationships with other countries in space endeavors. Blamont 
continues, stating that, many Europeans involved in space exploration believe that it is not a good idea to 
place “long-term strategic trust” in the United States, as the U.S. is a country that continues to put itself 
and its national image before scientific successes.”141 This is not the message we want to be conveying to 
the rest of the world.  
While ITAR regulations are in place to protect U.S. national security and national interests, some 
amount of deregulation does not mean dropping ITAR completely, which would render the U.S. 
extremely vulnerable. Modern security concerns necessitate the need for regulations over data sharing in 
order ensure the safety of American intelligence and information. However, if the United States were to 
critically examine what particular regulations need to be in place and focus overall on improving outreach 
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possibilities to other space-faring nations, this would demonstrate the U.S. government’s actual intentions 
to cooperate internationally in space exploration. The reasonable way forward is to open up opportunities 
for collaboration between the United States and other interested parties, be it nations or private 
corporations, in order to truly capitalize on the successes yet to be had in space. Taking an active role in 
the private space industry and seeking out collaborative roles is essential if the U.S. space program wishes 
to flourish in the new paradigm. 
The third arena in which it is imperative for the U.S. to fully embrace the new paradigm for space 
exploration is within the context of missions to Mars. If NASA is truly set on taking American astronauts 
to Mars, the Nation should be asking realistic question about how to achieve such an ambitious collective 
goal. The path to Mars is undoubtedly one on which many nations must join together, simply due to the 
size and scope a manned mission to Mars would entail. Whether the U.S. approaches missions to Mars 
with an international collaborative model in mid, or more like the old missions to the Moon that gave the 
United States a great sense of national pride, will be a true litmus test of the role the U.S. will take in 
these new endeavors. By looking at the framework for stated future U.S. missions to Mars, as well as 
what experts are recommending as courses of actions to Mars, we can see exactly how the “new 
paradigm” of space exploration plays out. 
Recommendation 3: The United States should fully embrace the new paradigm of space 
exploration by - lowering barriers like ITAR that hinder the competitiveness of the American space 
industry, committing to collaborative endeavors with rising space-faring nations such as China and 
abandoning Cold War era thinking, and paving the way to Mars by encouraging the participation of many 
nations and space agencies on future manned missions.  
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CONCLUSION 
 The examination of the changing narrative of space exploration in the United States is also an 
examination of the changing self-perception of the country in relation to the rest of the world. Space, by 
the nature of the word, means thinking outside of the boundaries of our own border, be it country or 
global borders. Because national interests have dictated U.S. direction in space exploration, this has meant 
that as the country finds itself at the crux of where it stands on the global stage politically, it also does so 
in space endeavors. 
 This paper’s historical narrative and content analysis were useful in bringing out some trends 
within the analyzed themes. 
 Competition as a driver kicked off the space program, but is no longer relevant with regard to 
Russia – and probably isn’t useful with regard to other countries going forward. 
 American prestige has been a consistent but never dominant theme in space exploration rhetoric. 
 International collaboration has been an important theme in all administrations, but it hasn’t 
always had the same meaning or connotation throughout each administration. 
 American leadership, while present in all administrations, gains momentum post-Cold War, as 
competition as a theme fades and the field of space exploration develops. 
 A new paradigm of space exploration emerges post-Cold War as an acknowledgement of 
changing times and more complex national and international interests. 
Further study of the trends would yield additional insight. One aspect that this paper could 
investigate further is how the meaning of the five analyzed themes has changed over time. Themes like 
competition, prestige, collaboration, leadership, and a changing world order rarely mean exactly the same 
thing over the course of history. It is also often found that individual, leadership-based interpretations of 
the themes dictate how they are used and the value attributed to them in any given administration. As time 
goes on, other themes may take precedence, and the approach used here could be repeated with new or 
additional themes in the future. Additionally, it would be interesting to utilize this same method of 
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historical narrative and content analysis to evaluate international science collaboration in other arenas, 
such as global climate change or sustainability in the Arctic. Other areas may also yield similar situations 
in which the United States has transitioned from a sense of competition toward more interest in 
international collaboration, and scientific collaboration could be used as a tool for diplomacy. 
 From the historical narrative and the content analysis, this paper uncovered three challenges to 
current U.S. efforts in space exploration. These challenges are: 1) there is a disconnect between stated 
policy goals in American space exploration efforts and the implementation of those goals, 2) the United 
States communicates mixed messages regarding its intent to be both the dominant leader in the field of 
space exploration and committed as a participant in international collaboration, and 3) the United States 
cannot remain a true pioneer of space exploration if it does not embrace the realities of globalization and 
the changing dynamics within the field of space exploration.  
The unknown is complicated, and space is the unknown. The United States, a country that has 
been at the forefront of exploration into space for much of history, currently has the opportunity to look 
back upon the past and critically analyze history, while also analyzing the present situation, in order to 
determine how it should move forward into the future. This paper offers three recommendations: 1) U.S. 
government and NASA should critically examine space exploration priorities and commit to 
implementing a program that will further realistic and robust stated policy and goals, 2) the U.S. should 
reexamine its intention to play a dominant leadership role in space exploration, and consider emphasizing 
a commitment toward active participation in international collaboration in space, and 3) the United States 
should fully embrace the new paradigm of space exploration by - lowering barriers like ITAR that hinder 
the competitiveness of the American space industry, committing to collaborative endeavors with rising 
space-faring nations such as China and abandoning Cold War era thinking, and paving the way to Mars 
by encouraging the participation of many nations and space agencies on future manned missions. 
The 1960s TV series Star Trek perhaps set out to suggest an idealistic future, in which individuals 
of many different cultural backgrounds stood side-by-side in the name of exploration. Idealistic though it 
may be, it is an idea that continues to present itself in the psyche of the human race as it into the “moving 
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frontier” of space, we are not only reminded of the recent past - a period of more direct competition and 
nationalistic impulses - but also that that particular past isn’t so far behind us as we might think. In 
today’s age of space exploration that is more complex and intricate than ever before, countries that wish 
to participate in this exciting field of discovery must decide what it is they hope to achieve, and in doing 
this, their interests will shape how they go about interacting with the rest of the world in the field of space 
industry. Is it too ambitious to envision a future in which the nations of this world set aside national 
interests to come together in the name of progress of the human race? Boldly going where no one has 
gone before, not solely for the sake of a singular nation, but instead exploring the cosmos in a collective 
pursuit of knowledge to find solutions to our greatest global challenges. 
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